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ABSTRACT
Due to the advent of the Internet, electronic business transactions have exploded around the globe. Along with the
Internet, wireless technology has exponentially developed as well. Today, new technologies that allow mobile (cellular)
phones and other handheld devices to access the Internet have made wireless business transactions possible. This
phenomenon is known as mobile commerce or M-Commerce. It has been predicted that the number of mobile phones
connected to the mobile Internet will exceed the number of Internet-connected PCs before 2007. The mobile phone will
therefore become the most prevalent device for accessing the Internet. Several industry analysts predict that Mcommerce will constitute a multibillion dollar business by 2005. However, M-Commerce brings new challenges in
providing information security as information travels through multiple networks often across wireless links. What must
be done to secure financial transactions via mobile commerce? Generally speaking, M-Commerce creates more security
concerns than traditional E-Commerce. In this paper, security measures in M-Commerce, wireless security, and the
application of cryptography for key generation, authentication, digital signature and digital certificate are discussed.
Key words: M-Commerce, wireless security, elliptic curve cryptography, WLAN security, Bluetooth
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile commerce, commonly known as M-Commerce,
‘is concerned with the use, application and integration of
wireless telecommunication technologies and wireless
devices’, such as Internet-enabled mobile phones,
personal digital assistants (PDA), palmtops, laptops, and
pagers, commonly know as handheld wireless devices
(HWD). The discipline of M-Commerce includes
reference to the infrastructures and electronic
technologies necessary for wireless data and information
transfer in the form of text, graphics, voice, and video.
M-Commerce is a subset of electronic commerce where
the Internet-enabled HWDs and wireless networking
environment are necessary to provide ‘location
independent connectivity’. It is predicted that MCommerce services would be the next biggest growth
area in the telecommunications market, represent-ing the
fusion of two of the current consumer technologies:
wireless communications and E-Commerce [7].
Mobile communications is now considered a relatively
mature technology with the transition from second to
third generation (3G) wireless technology and with its
high consumer acceptance. 3G wireless technology
provides a variety of services and capabilities in addition
to voice communication, such as multimedia data
transfer, video streaming, video telephony, and full
Internet access. 3G mobile phones provide high-speed
data transfer and are designed to support large numbers
of users more effi-ciently allowing for future expansion
in user capacity. This technology was first introduced in
Japan in 2001 and then spread in Europe and USA in

2002. In Japan mobile commerce has been a huge
success, accounting for over $400 million in revenues
each year [8]. In 2003, there were about 800 million
Web-enabled cellular phones in use worldwide. By 2004,
the worldwide number of Web-enabled mobile phones is
projected to rise to one billion. The M-Commerce market
may rise to $200 billion by 2004 (Gartner Group). It has
been predicted that the number of mobile phones
connected to the mobile Internet will exceed the number
of Internet-connected PCs before 2007. The mobile
phone will therefore become the most pre-valent device
for accessing the Internet and M-Commerce. Several
industry analysts predict that mobile commerce will
constitute a multibillion dollar business by 2005.
However, once again, the question of security arises.
What must be done to secure financial transactions via
mobile commerce? Secure mobile commerce will be a
key area within the expanding functionality of mobile
phones. Generally speaking, M-Commerce creates more
security concerns than traditional E-Commerce.
2. APPLICATIONS OF M-COMMERCE
There is a wide variety of applications of M-Commerce.
For example, Smart cards with an embedded integrated
microchip can be used as prepaid phone cards, ATM
cards, or public transportation cards. They can be
biometrically enhanced to include voice recognition, iris
and face scans, and finger print authentication. In France,
some 35 million Smart cards are in circulation and every
year they process over three billion transactions [4].
Wireless banking refers to purchasing over Internetenabled HWDs like wireless application protocol (WAP)
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phones or PDAs. Interactive TV is enhanced TV where
additional content is added to an existing broadcast
format that the viewer can query, request or even interact
live with the program. It has reserved channels and
bandwidth for data applications such as weather, news,
games, or commerce. It also offers services like Video
on Demand (VOD) or Personal Video Recording (PVR).
Companies are providing facilities to track stocks on
HWDs. Aspiro, a Swedish company, allow its customers
to check stock prices or look at their portfolios and even
trade using WAP phones or PDAs. Accessing
information using WAP mobile phones and PDAs is
significantly becoming popular for business-to-business
(B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C) applica-tions.
Mobile and wireless technologies have been an integral
part of defense and military ever since these technologies
were available. In light of growing concern with
cyberterrorism, security has undoubtedly become the
single most important issue because many U.S. intelligence services use mobile technologies and wireless
networks for communication and commerce.
3. M-COMMERCE SECURITY CONCERNS
M-Commerce is bringing together two technologies,
wireless communication and traditional E-Commerce,
with a history of security problems. Coupled with the
conver-gence of voice and data communications, interconnection with external data networks and issues
surrounding the transactions themselves, the potential
risks are very high [7]. There are three basic security
components in M-Commerce: (a) Transaction:
protecting the transaction parties and their data by
providing an acceptable level of security, (b)
Information: protecting valuable and sensitive
information about customers, and (c) Infrastructure:
protecting the network infrastructure from attack.
Mobile 3D is Visa International’s new global secure
specification that is expected to ensure the security of
Internet payments made over mobile devices [14]. It was
developed in conjunction with some 15 industries,
including Ericsson, Motorola, and Oracle Mobile, and
was launched in September 2001. It extends payment
authen-tication initiatives into M-Commerce, enabling
the Visa card issuers to validate the identity of their
cardholders in real time, ensures that payment data sent
over open networks is not compromised and allows
consumers to actively protect their Visa accounts from
unauthorized use, and supports global interoperability,
enabling consumers to have a consistent and seamless
experience regardless of the method or device being used
to access the Internet. A number of Visa M-Commerce
programs are currently underway worldwide to test the
validity of M-Commerce payment solutions and raise
consumers awareness. In Asia, Visa has partnered with
Hutchison Telecommunications and Dao Heng Bank to
develop a mobile payment service using Mobile 3D
Secure. In Europe, Visa has made a strategic alliance
with Omnitel Vodafone, while in the US, Visa and Sprint

are working together to help facilitate secure mobile
payments.
A satisfactory level of security is required for the
successful deployment of HWDs. To a certain extent, it
seems reasonable to utilize solutions used for the wired
environment in the case of the wireless environment.
However, this approach is not always feasible because of
the differences between the wired and wireless environments. For example, because of the hardware limitations
of the HWDs, no large routing tables can be maintained
on these devices, thus increasing the risk of a denial-ofservice attack. Furthermore, wireless communications
make physical eavesdropping almost undetectable [10].
Similar
to
wired
communication,
wireless
communication also needs three basic security
requirements: (i) confiden-tiality- information is
disclosed only to legitimate entities or processes, (ii)
integrity- unauthorized modification of information is
prevented, and (iii) availability- authorized entities can
access a service provided they have appro-priate
privileges. The mechanisms suitable to the HWD are
discussed here.
M-Commerce needs several layers of security: (i) device
security, (ii) language security, (iii) wireless security,
and (iv) cryptographic security.
3.1 Device Security
Within the design of mobile devices, there are a number
of high quality security features. The most important of
these are: (i) a built-in password mechanism which will
lock after several mistyped attempts and (ii) an industry
approved, tamper-proof smart card, known as Subscriber
Identification Module (SIM) card.
The SIM card and the mobile device are always stored
together and the device is an every day utility object that
is easily lost or stolen. Time-out and key-locks are often
not used on phones. This means that as long as the phone
remains turned on the strong password system will be
bypassed. All WAP data, in some popular handsets, is
stored in the phone’s memory, not in the SIM; this will
include login and password information. These features
certainly diminish the security of the mobile phone. The
SIM card used in mobile devices are de facto microprocessor and they can be used to facilitate mobile
commerce. Gemplus SIM cards features a digital
signature and public key encryption [11] and the
technology is embedded in the card. In May 1999,
Motorola, jointly with Identix, a biometrics company,
developed fingerprint scanning devices, called the DFR
300 that is 4.5 milli- meters thick [2]. This scanning
device can now be incor-porated into the HWDs.
3.2 Language Security
If special purpose M-Commerce software, such as a
stock trading application, is to be deployed on mobile
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devices, then Java is the recommended language to be
used as the deployment language on the HWDs. By
using Java, the amount of software that needs to be
changed in order to adopt the application to various
mobile platforms is minimized. Feasible Java execution
environments are available for PDAs, Smart phones,
Communicators (such as Symbian), laptops, and other
platforms. Maffeis [6] also recommended using server
side Java technology, such as the Jave-2 Enterprise
Edition (J2EE) platform, in the data center. This allows
for shorter time-to-market and avoids vendor lock-in.

Language (WML) is used in WAP 1.x technology.
Figure 1 shows WAP gap model.
WAP 1.x

WAP (Wireless Applications Protocol) is ‘an open,
global specification that empowers mobile users with
wireless devices to easily access and interact with
information and services instantly.’ WAP is currently the
only publicly available solution for wireless
communication and enables M-Commerce where
Internet data moves to and from wireless devices. WAPenabled phones can access interactive services such as
information,
location-based
services,
corporate
information and interactive entertain-ment. WAP is
targeted at various types of HWD and Bluetooth enabled
mobile phones.
WAP 1.x security uses the Wireless Transport Layer
Security (WTLS) protocol. This protocol is the WAP
equivalent of Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and it provides
authentication, encryption and integrity services. WTLS
has three levels, all have privacy and integrity: (i) Class1 has no authentication (anonymous), (ii) Class-II has
server authentication only, and (iii) Class-III has both
client and server authentication. WTLS supports some
familiar algo-rithms like Diffe-Hellman, RC5, SHA-1,
and IDEA. It also supports some trusted methods like
DES and 3DES, but it does not support Blowfish and
PGP [9].
Since Web- and WAP-based protocols are not directly
interoperable, a component known as the WAP gateway
is needed in order to translate Web-based protocols to
and from WAP-based protocols. The WAP gateway is a
software that runs on the computer of the Mobile Service
Provider (MSP). Thus sensitive information is translated
into original unencrypted form at the WAP gateway [5].
This problem is known as WAP gap.
Public key cryptography (PKC) is used to exchange a
symmetric or private key using certificate and then all
transmission is encrypted. A short key size of 40 bits is
used because of power limitation. A tamper-proof
compo-nent, know as WIM (Wireless Identity Module)
is designed as part of the WAP architecture to store
private data, such as key pairs, certificates, and PIN
numbers within the mobile device. In practice, a WIM is
imple-mented using a smart card. Wireless Markup

WAP Gateway

WTLS

3.3 Wireless Security
3.3.1 WAP Security

809

Web Server

TLS/SSL

encryption gap

Figure 1 WAP Gap Model (not a full end-to-end
security)
WAP 2.0 security uses TLS (Transportation Layer
Security) instead of WTLS due to requiring end-to-end
security with all IP based technology in order to
overcome the WAP gateway security breaches. It is a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) enabling protocol that
provides the services such as authentication by using
digital signatures and public key certificates,
confidentiality by encrypting data, etc. This protocol
uses RSA, RC4, 3DES, and SHA-1 algorithms for
encryption. Wireless PKI (WPKI) is released for the first
time. Figure 2 shows the WAP proxy model.
WAP 2.0

WAP Proxy

SSL/TLS

Web Server

SSL/TLS

Figure 2 WAP Proxy Model (end-to-end security)
3.3.2 PKI/WPKI
PKI systems and WTLS are at the heart of today’s
mobile security technology. In a WAP environment
WTLS must be translated at the WAP gateway into SSL,
the Internet standard. A PKI is a set of policies,
processors, software, hardware, and technologies that use
PKC and certificate management to secure
communication [18]. PKI’s trusted services enable the
secure transfer of information and supports a wide
variety of M-Commerce applications. PKI must ensure
the following: (i) confidentiality, achieved by
cryptography, (ii) authentication, achieved by digital
certi- ficates, (iii) integrity, achieved by digital
signatures, and (iv) nonrepudiation, achieved by digital
signatures and certificates.
PKI consists of the following components: (i) Certificate
Authority (CA)- responsible for issuing and revoking
certificates, (ii) Registration Authority (RA)- binding
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between public key and the identities of their holders,
(iii) Certificate Holders- people, machine or soft-ware
agents that have been issued with certificates and can use
them to sign digital documents, (iv) Verification
Authority (VA, Clients)- validate digital signatures and
their certificates from a known public key of a trusted
CA, and (v) Repositories- stores that make available
certificates.
WPKI is an optimized extension of traditional PKI for
the wireless environment. ‘WPKI encompasses the necessary cryptographic technology and a set of security
management standards that are widely recognized and
accepted for meeting the security needs of MCommerce’ [18]. WPKI applications have to work in an
environment with less powerful CPUs, less memory,
restricted power consumption, and smaller displays.
WPKI solutions are likely to employ “network agents”
that take care of some of these tasks. The HWD must at
least be able to perform a digital signature function to
permit the establishment of a WPKI. Network agents can
perform all other WPKI-related tasks such as validation,
archiving or certificate delivery. Figure 3 shows a
schematic diagram of WPKI.
Wireless Device

Web Server

WPKI

WPKI

PKI Portal

Figure 3 Wireless PKI
The private keys are stored in WIM or SWIM. Two main
components of WPKI are the PKC and the key
certification management. In order to perform globally,
worldwide PKI legislation is required.
A number of companies, including Entrust, Certicom,
RSA Security, VeriSign, and Baltimore, have announced
solutions enabling the use of PKI software in a wireless
environment. The biggest challenge in implementing a
PKI solution for wireless deployment lies in the devices
them-selves. With limited bandwidth and low power, a
small screen and no keyboard, the average mobile device
presents a number of unique problems. Certicom developed Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) that reduced
the key size from RSA’s 1024 bits to as few as 56 bits
and made handling certificates a lot easier for lowbandwidth and low-power devices [2]. This technique
can process a digital signature in a second compared to
the RSA technique, which takes almost 15 seconds to
process a digital signature on a Palm device. Both Nokia
and Ericsson have been supporting server certificates
since the middle of 2000.

3.4 Wireless LAN (WLAN) Security
3.4.1 IEEE 802.11b
The WLAN standard IEEE 802.11b provides a
mechanism for authentication and encryption. It provides
a maximum of 11 Mbps wireless Ethernet connections
using the band at 2.4 GHz. 802.11b security features
consists of security framework called Wired Equivalent
Privacy (WEP). WEP is based on RC4, a symmetric
stream cipher. It has a pseudo-random number generator,
whose output is XORed to the data. WEP can use 40 or
128 bits key size. However, using a 128 bits key size,
802.11b throughput drops much due to heavy
calculations. In August 2001, RC4 was announced to be
broken and can be cracked in less than half an hour.
Consequently, WEP can be broken. WEP with 40 bits
key size can be broken in real time.
3.4.2 Bluetooth
Bluetooth technology, developed by Ericsson in 1998, is
used to connect different HWDs and provides a method
for authenticating devices. Device authentication is
provided using a shared secret between the two devices.
The common shared secret is called a link key, generated
from PIN. This link key is established in a special
communi-cation session called pairing. All paired
devices share a common link key. There are two types of
link keys: (i) unit keys and (ii) combination keys [17].
The link key is a 128-bit random number.
A device using a unit key uses the same secret for all of
its connections. Unit keys are appropriate for devices
with limited memory or a limited user interface. During
the pairing procedure the unit key is encrypted and
transferred to the other unit. Only one of the two paired
units is allowed to use a unit key. Combination keys are
link keys that are unique to a particular pair of devices
and they are only used to protect the communication
between these two devices. Clearly a device that uses a
unit key is not as secure as a device that uses a
combination key. Since a unit key is common to all
devices with which the device has been paired, all such
devices have knowledge of the unit key. Consequently
they are able to eavesdrop on any traffic based on this
key.
In every Bluetooth device, there are four entities used for
maintaining the security at the link level: (i) the
Bluetooth device has an IEEE defined 48-bit unique
address, (ii) a private authentication key which is a 128bit random number, (iii) a 8-128 bit long private
encryption key, and (iv) a random number, which is
frequently a changing 128-bit number that is made by the
Bluetooth device itself [12]. The security algorithms of
Bluetooth are considered strong. Bluetooth standard does
not use the RC4 cipher; rather it uses the E1, a modified
block cipher SAFER+. No practical direct attack has
been reported.
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4. CRYPTOGRAPHY
The two types of cryptography currently available are (a)
symmetric or secret-key and (b) asymmetric or public
key cryptography (PKC). In secret-key cryptography,
two devices must share their secret key in order to
commu-nicate securely. Thus two concerns arise: how to
exchange the secret key securely; and if n HWDs must
communicate with each other, a total number of O(n2)
secret keys must be exchanged. The management of such
a number of secret keys should consider the scalability
issues.
In PKC, both the above problems are solved since two
parties in the communication do not require exchanging
any secret keys. According to this consideration, PKC
seems to be the ideal candidate to enforce confidentiality.
Cryptographic techniques already exist to protect data
transmission over the Internet. The de facto
cryptographic algorithm for digital signatures and for
encryption of secret keys is the RSA PKC. For electronic
commerce, it is a highly secure technique. Although
RSA is highly secure and widely used, there are some
potential problems with its use in M-Commerce: (i) in
RSA the key size is large which requires a significant
amount of memory for storage, (ii) decryption time
increases rapidly as the key size increases, and (iii) key
generation is complex and time consuming. Memory
constrained devices cannot easily generate RSA keys and
therefore may need to have keys generated by another
system. Moreover, the computations needed to encrypt
and decrypt messages using RSA is overwhelming
compared to secret key cryptography.
4.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
What is really needed is a public key algorithm that
achieves a high level of security using short keys. Algorithms based on mathematical objects known as elliptic
curves offer interesting possibilities [1]. Elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problems (ECDLP) is defined as “give
a base point P and the kP lying on the curve, find the
value of k”. From cryptographic point of view, a new
crypto-graphic system needs to be defined based on
elliptic curves. Any standard system that relies on the
discrete logarithm problem has a direct analogy based on
the ECDLP. For example, Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) has already been
standardized. Diffie-Hellman key exchange can be easily
implemented in an elliptic curve system.
Certicom promotes the use of ECC, as well as its mobile
Virtual Private Network (VPN) client, and a client,
which bring sophisticated security functionality to
resource-constrained devices. WPKI ECC is recognized
as the most optimized and therefore the best suited for
supporting security in the wireless environment. The key
for digital signature in ECC is 163 bits as compared to
1024 bits in other signature schemes. However, good
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elliptic curves must be carefully chosen, otherwise it
might be prone to various attacks. ECC is small, efficient
and requires low power. Table 1 shows key sizes for
ECC and RSA.
Table 1 EEC Key Size compared to RSA
ECC Key Traditional RSA
Key Size
Size
Key Size (bits)
Ratio
(bits)
109
512
1:5
131
768
1:6
163
1,024
1:6
283
3,072
1:11
409
7,680
1:19
571
15,360
1:27
Recently, ECC has been deployed on Smartcards without
coprocessors [16]. Weimerskirch et al [15] implemented
ECC on a Palm OS device. Their study showed that the
normal transaction, such as a key exchange or signature
verification, can be done in less than 2.4 seconds while
signature generation can be done in less than 0.9 seconds.
Table 2 shows the three major industry standard PKC
systems that can be considered secure, efficient, and
commercially available [13].
Table 2 Three Major Industry-Standard PKC
PKC
Mathematical
Algorithm
Problem
Integer
Given a number n,
RSA, Rabinfactorization
find its prime factors
Williams
Discrete
Given a prime n, and
ElGamal,
logarithm
numbers g and h, find Diffiex such that
Hellman,
h = gx mod n
DSA
EC discrete
Given an elliptic
EC-Diffielogarithm
curve E and points P
Hellman,
and Q on E, find x
ECDSA
such that Q = xP
4.2 Problems with Elliptic Curve System
The true difficulty of the ECDLP is not yet fully understood [1]. Recent research has shown that some elliptic
curves that were believed suitable for ECC are, in fact,
not appropriate. For example, if the order of the base
point P is equal to the prime number p then it turns out
that the ECDLP can be solved efficiently. Such curves
are known as anomalous curves. For a given curve and
base point, it is trivial to generate public and private keys
(the private key is simply a random integer k and the
public key is the point kP on the curve). However, it is an
extremely difficult problem to generate a suitable curve
and base point in the first place.
The main problem is how to count the number of points
on the curve. Having done this, it is then necessary to
select a suitable base point P, which must have a large
order to ensure the difficulty of the ECDLP. But the
order of P must divide the number of points on the curve.
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Having found the number of points on the curve, it is
quite likely that a suitable base point cannot be found.
Users may use random curves or special curve
generating soft-ware, such as the “Elliptic Curve
Generation Bureau” created by Zaxus.
In April 2000, the French National Institute for Research
in Computer Science and Control announced that the
109-bit ECC key was cracked in a four-month bruteforce effort using 9,500 computers by 1300 volunteers
from 40 countries [3]. The amount of work required was
about 50 times that required to solve a 512-bit RSA
cryptosystem. The NIST has endorsed 163-bit ECC and
WAP standards to be used in HWDs.
4.3 Digital Certificates and Digital Signature
In a PKC, a message is encrypted using a public key and
is decrypted using a secret key. However, there is no
inherent way of knowing the person who has the
corresponding secret key. This is where the idea of
certificates arises. Certificates confirm that the public
key given in the certificate belongs to a private key held
by the legitimate person, not by an imposter. To trust a
certificate means to trust the party who issued the
certificate, not the person for whom the certificate is
issued. To protect a certificate from being modified one
uses digital signatures. The message can only be created
from the ciphertext by the private key holder. This
provides authorization and non-repudiation. That is the
basis for digital signature.
How to protect private keys? The private key is stored in
a Smart card, where all crypto operations with it are
performed. The Smart card access gets restricted by the
use of a PIN. The place where a user’s private
credentials are stored is called Personal Security
Environment (PSE).
5. CONCLUSION
M-Commerce security is a very crucial issue that needs
further research to introduce efficient and effective
solutions. In this article, various security concerns were
expounded. ECC certainly appears to provide a viable
alternative to RSA. There are potential advantages,
especially when used in devices with limited processing
capability and memory. Typical applications include MCommerce using handheld wireless devices. There are,
however, some problems and issues that are inhibiting
the widespread adoption of ECC. These include (i) the
real security of such systems is still not well understood,
(ii) difficulty of generating suitable curves, and (iii)
relatively slow signature verification. Time will tell its
future.
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